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Accord and Satisfaction Under
Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-207:
Scholl v. Tallman
An accord and satisfaction is "a discharge by the rendering of
some performance different from that which was claimed as due and
the acceptance of such substituted performance by the claimant as full
satisfaction of his claim."' Although accord and satisfaction can take
different forms, this Case Comment will focus on the results achieved
when a debtor tenders a check in full settlement of an unliquidated
debt. The general rule is applied when the amount or existence of a
debt is in dispute and the debtor tenders a check in full satisfaction of
his obligation. The cashing of the check by the creditor, with knowl-
edge that the check was tendered in full settlement, extinguishes the
debt. Thus, an unsuspecting creditor may find himself legally power-
less to collect the full amount of a debt owing to him because he
cashed a check from the debtor marked "payment in full."
In Scholl v. Tallman,2 the Supreme Court of South Dakota held
that a creditor may avoid accord and satisfaction although he cashes a
check tendered by a debtor in full satisfaction of an unliquidated
debt.' The creditor in Scholl cashed the debtor's check after striking
out the debtor's notation on the back of the check that it was offered
in full settlement of the debt.4 In addition, the creditor wrote on the
back of the check that he did not accept it in full satisfaction, and he
noted the amount that he believed was still owed by the debtor.5
The South Dakota court, taking a position that is a radical departure
from the common-law doctrine,6 held that the creditor's precautions
in Scholl were sufficient to avoid accord and satisfaction and that he
could sue for the amount he claimed to be due.
The South Dakota court based its decision in part upon section
1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to as
Code], which provides: "A party who with explicit reservation of rights
performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a
manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby
prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice,'
'under protest' or the like are sufficient."8 Since the Code has been
1. 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1276, at 115 (1962).
2. 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
3. Id. at 492.
4. Id. at 491.
5. Id.
6. But see Siegele v. Des Moines Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 28 S.D. 142, 132 N.W. 697 (1911).
7. 247 N.W.2d at 492-93.
8. U.C.C. § 1-207.
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adopted in forty-nine states and since one of the underlying purposes
is "to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions,"9 the
Scholl decision could have a broad impact upon the law throughout
the country.
However, Scholl should not be followed in other jurisdictions for
a variety of reasons. First, the South Dakota court based its decision
in part upon weak case law interpreting a South Dakota pre-Code
statute. Second, Code section 1-207 was not intended by the drafters
of the Code to apply to accord and satisfaction. Third, the Scholl
court made questionable use of prior case authority in applying Code
section 1-207. Finally, the South Dakota court failed to recognize
that accord and satisfaction is built upon the basic contract doctrine
of mutual assent.
I. BASIC ACCORD AND SATISFACTION DOCTRINE
In order to discuss the accord and satisfaction framework in which
Scholl was decided, a distinction must first be drawn between liqui-
dated and unliquidated debts. A liquidated debt is either a fixed sum
or one that can be calculated from figures at hand.'0 Pinnel's Case, 1
decided by the Court of Common Pleas in 1602, stated in dictum that
partial payment of a liquidated debt on the day the debt was due
would not satisfy the debt. 12 This dictum was adopted over 280 years
later by the House of Lords in Foakes v. Beer, 3 and it has been the
accepted doctrine since that time."
The rule of Foakes v. Beer, however, has not been applied when
a debt is unliquidated,"5 that is, when either the debtor's liability or
the amount due is in dispute; therefore, it is possible to achieve ac-
cord and satisfaction of an unliquidated debt by substituting partial
payment for payment in full. First there must be a bona fide dispute
over the debt.' 6 The debtor then offers to satisfy the debt by paying
some amount in the disputed range. This is frequently accomplished
by sending a check for less than the amount claimed, while indicating,
usually by notation on the check, that it is to be accepted as payment
in full. If the creditor cashes the check, an accord and satisfaction
will be found in the vast majority of jurisdictions.' 7 The analysis is
usually in terms of offer and acceptance:
9. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(C).
10. Charnley v. Sibley, 73 F. 980, 982 (7th Cir. 1896).
11. 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (C.P. 1602).
12. Id. at 237.
13. 9 L.R. 605 (H.L. 1884).
14. 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1281, at 137 n.31 (1962).
15. Baird v. United States, 96 U.S. 430, 431 (1877).
16. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564, 577 (1891).
17. 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1279, at 127 n.17 (1962); 15 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
1854, at 543 n.7 (3d ed. 1972).
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[W]hen a check is sent upon the condition that it be accepted in full pay-
ment of a disputed claim, there is, as a general rule, but one of two
courses open to the creditor, either to decline the offer and return the
check or accept it with the condition attached. The moment the creditor
indorses and collects the check, knowing it was offered only upon con-
dition, he thereby agrees to the condition .... is
In most cases, this rule is not changed by the fact that the creditor
scratches out the words "paid in full" or adds a statement indicating
that the creditor accepts the money as partial payment only.19
II. THE DECISION
During 1971, the Scholl Construction Company performed work
for Clinton and Virginia Talman. The Tallmans made several pay-
ments in cash and by check during 1971 and 1972 toward satisfaction
of their $2,927.37 debt owed to Scholl. Since the Tallmans believed
that several hundred dollars in cash payments had not been credited
to their account, they sent a check on November 4, 1974, for $500
marked "Wesley Scholl Settlement in Full for all Labor and Materials
to Date."20  Scholl then cashed the check after striking out the Tall-
mans' notation and writing "Restriction of payment in full refused.
$1,826.65 remains due and payable."2' The trial court held with the
weight of authority that accord and satisfaction was a complete de-
fense to Scholl's suit for the balance of the debt he claimed was due.Y
The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the lower court's de-
cision, but limited its decision to the facts presented by Scholl, in
which the creditor conditioned his endorsement of the Tallmans'
check with an explicit reservation of rights.2 The decision was based
on the construction of two South Dakota statutes.
The first statute, South Dakota Compiled Laws section 20-7-4,
provides: "Part performance of an obligation, either before or after
a breach thereof, when expressly accepted by the creditor in writing
in satisfaction, or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in writing
for that purpose, though without any new consideration, extinguishes
the obligation. 24  The Scholl court based its interpretation of this
18. Qualseth v. Thompson, 44 S.D. 190, 193, 183 N.W. 116, 116 (1921) (quoting 1 RuLt.LG
CASE LAw Accord and Satisfaction § 32, at 196-197 (1914)). Accord, Hutchinson v. Culbert-
son, 161 Pa. Super. Ct. 519, 55 A.2d 567 (1947). See also I C.S. Accord and Satisfaction §
33-34 (1936).
19. See, e.g., Boohaker v. Trott, 274 Ala. 12, 145 So. 2d 179 (1962); Hudson v. Yonkers
Fruit Co., 258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373 (1932).
20. 247 N.W.2d at 491.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 492.
24. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-7-4 (1967) (corresponds to S.D. RE%. CODE § 787
(1919); S.D. CODE § 47.0235 (1939)).
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statute upon the 1911 case of Siegele v. Des Moines Mut. Hail Ins.
Ass'n.25 In Siegele the South Dakota Supreme Court had held that
section 20-7-4 allowed a creditor to cash a check tendered in full
satisfaction of a debt without prejudicing his right to collect the bal-
ance of the debt.
26
The South Dakota Supreme Court explained that Siegele con-
tained the rationale embodied in South Dakota's version of Code sec-
tion 1-20727 as well. In construing section 1-207, the South Dakota
court relied on Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp.,28 a
North Carolina appellate court case, and Hanna v. Perkins,29 a New
York county court decision. In addition, the South Dakota court
relied on text from a 1961 report of the Commission on Uniform
State Laws30 and on the comments of co-authors of a text on the
Code.31  The Scholl court found these authorities persuasive for the
proposition that Code section 1-207 authorizes a creditor to reserve
his right to sue for the balance of an unliquidated debt he believes is
due before cashing a check tendered in full satisfaction of that debt?2
III. THE BASES OF THE DECISION
A. South Dakota Compiled Laws, Section 20-7-4
Aspects of the Siegele decision cast a shadow on its value as
authority for the effect of a conditional endorsement under South
Dakota Compiled Laws section 20-74. 33 First, Siegele arguably dealt
with the attempted accord and satisfaction of a liquidated obligation,
whereas Scholl involved an unliquidated debt. In Siegele, an in-
surance company sent a check to Siegele in the amount of $400 after
the company had settled with Siegele, according to his testimony, at
$925.34  Siegele cashed the check for $400 after reserving his right to
the balance of the settlement amount.35 At trial, the insurance com-
pany claimed that the settlement had been for $400 and that since
25. 28 S.D. 142, 132 N.W. 697 (1911).
26. Id. at 144, 132 N.W. at 698.
27. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 57-1-23 (1967).
28. 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969).
29. 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1044 (Westchester County Ct. N.Y. 1965).
30. COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, NEW YORK ANNOIATIONS TO UNIFORM COM-
MERICAL CODE AND REPORT OF COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS TO LEGISLATURD OF
NEW YORK STATE 19-20 (1961).
31. J. WHITE & R. SUMnERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER TIlE UNIFORM COMNIER-
CIAL CODE §§ 13-21, at 452-454 (1972).
32. 247 N.W.2d at 492.
33. At the time of the Siegele decision, the equivalent of Soumh DAKOTA COMPILED LAWS
§ 20-7-4 was S.D. REV. CiV. CODE § 1880 (1903).




the check was inscribed with the words, "This check accepted as
payment in full for all claims to date,"35 Siegele had extinguished
his claim by cashing the check, whether the debt was $400 or $925."
In the lower court, there was a question of fraud on the part of the
insurance company, and the jury found that the insurance company
had indeed agreed to settle with Siegele for $925.38 Since Siegele
was decided on the basis of the jury's finding that the obligation of
the insurance company had been settled or liquidated at $925, its
value as authority on the law of accord and satisfaction is question-
able. A party cannot simply refuse to pay a settled sum and thereby
create an unliquidated debt.39  "The test in such cases is, was the
dispute honest or fraudulent? If honest, it affords the basis for an ac-
cord between the parties . . ... 4 In Scholl, on the other hand, the
parties had never agreed upon the amount of the debt. The debtors
believed that some of their payments had not been properly credited
to their account, and the creditor claimed that all of their payments
had been accounted for.4 The result of Siegele would have been
contrary to the rule of Foakes v. Beer if the court had allowed the
insurance company's check for $400 to satisfy its settled obligation to
pay $925. Scholl, on the other hand, presented the case of an un-
liquidated debt, to which the Foakes prohibition of accord and satis-
faction is not applicable at common law.42 Therefore, if the court
wished to interpret section 20-7-4 to prevent accord and satisfaction
of an unliquidated debt, Siegele was improper authority upon which
to base this interpretation.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the debt in Siegele was unliqui-
dated, the Scholl court's use of Siegele was questionable. The Siegele
construction of section 20-7-4 had arguably been overruled, or at least
severely limited, by the South Dakota Supreme Court in a case not
even mentioned in the Scholl opinion-Adams v. Morehead.43  In
Adams, the debtor sent a draft for $100 "to close my accountr 44 in
settlement of an unliquidated debt. The creditor acknowledged the
draft, but wrote to the debtor asking him to sign a note for the bal-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 143-44, 132 N.W. at 698.
38. Id. at 143, 132 N.W. at 698.
39. De Mars v. Musser-Sauntry Land, Logging and Mfg. Co., 37 Minn. 418, 35 N.W. 1
(1887).
40. Simons v. Supreme Council Am. Legion of Honor, 178 N.Y. 263, 265, 70 N.E. 776. 776
(1904).
41. Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490,490-91 (S.D. 1976).
42. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
43. 45 S.D. 216, 186 N.W. 830 (1922).
44. Id. at 217, 186 N.W. at 830.
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ance. The lower court found the creditor's actions to be tantamount
to a conditional endorsement of the draft and held that the creditor
was not precluded from suing to collect the balance of the debt owed
him. 45  The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the lower court
decision for the creditor,46 bringing South Dakota in line with other
authorities that state that a reservation of rights is futile when a
creditor accepts partial payment of an unliquidated debt.47 Thus, even
if the debt in Siegele was unliquidated, it would seem that Adams
overruled the holding in Siegele by implication since in Adams the
creditor accepted a check tendered in settlement of an unliquidated
debt after reserving his rights. Yet in Scholl the court stated that
Siegele was never overruled. 41 Should the Scholl decision be fol-
lowed, it should not be on the basis of the rationale contained in
Siegele.
B. Code Section 1-207
The most significant weakness of Scholl arises not from the South
Dakota court's construction of the state's pre-Code statute, but from
its misuse of section 1-207 of the Code. When interpreting a section
of the Code, the intention of the drafters, as determined from the
history of the Code and the interpretation of the state adoption com-
mittees, is crucial. Often a court will have no other sources of
authority upon which to rely. The history of the Code demonstrates
that the drafters did not intend for Code section 1-207 to apply to
accord and satisfaction and that the South Dakota legislature did not
foresee such an application.
1. Legislative History
A 1948 law review article noted in relation -to accord and satis-
faction that:
A discerning solution has been advanced in the proposed draft of
the Commercial Code, published April 15, 1948, by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of the American Law
Institute, § 902(3) of which reads, "Where an instrument by its terms
provides that it is taken in full satisfaction of an obligation the payee by
obtaining payment of the instrument or by negotiating it discharges the
obligation unless he establishes that unconscionable advantage has been
taken by the obligor.'A9
45. Id.
46. Id. at 218, 186 N.W. at 830.
47. See note 19 supra.
48. 247 N.W.2d at 492.
49. Note, Role of the Check in Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon of the Overreaching Deb-
tor, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 99, 109 (1948) (emphasis in original deleted).
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With a minor addition, this section appeared in the 1949 draft of the
Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to as 1949 Code Draft]
as section 3-802(3).5o The title of the section was "Effect of Instru-
ment on Obligation for Which it is Given." Official Comment five to
the section specifically noted that the section would apply to checks
tendered in full payment of all claims. The comment further noted
that the most sweeping change that section 3-802(3) would make in
the common law was that an accord and satisfaction could be con-
summated even when a debt was undisputed and liquidated, a con-
siderable change in the law for many states.5 1 This change is demon-
strated by the decisions noted in the Pennsylvania Annotations to the
Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, which indicate that the pre-
Code decisions in that state were in accord with section 3-802(3)
when the obligation was disputed, but contrary when the obligation
was undisputed.52 In the 1950 Uniform Commercial Code Proposed
Final Draft [hereinafter referred to as 1950 Final Code Draft], sec-
tion 3-802(3) of the 1949 Code Draft appeared under the same title
but as section 3-702(3) with modifications in the text.53 The comments
were similar to those in the 1949 Code Draft.
Section 1-207 first appeared in the 1950 Final Code Draft,-
containing text, comments, and cross references identical to those
included in the current Code."5 The common situations in which section
1-207 was meant to apply were outlined in the first comment to that
section and were explained by one author as follows:
Obviously, the section should apply to the situations in which a buyer
makes an instalment payment under a contract which he thinks the seller
has breached, or the buyer accepts a delivery that he feels does not
conform to the contract, or the seller goes ahead with his performance
in spite of an anticipatory repudiation by the buyer.
56
50. U.C.C. § 3-802(3) (1949 draft) provided:
Where an instrument by its terms provides that it is taken in full satisfaction of an obli-
gation the payee by obtaining payment of the instrument or by negotiating it dis-
charges the obligation unless he establishes that unconscionable advantage has been
taken by the obligor, or unless the drawer initiates the collection of the instrument on
behalf of the payee.
51. U.C.C. § 3-802, Official Comment 5 (1949 draft).
52. SUBCOMMrITEE ON TIlE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE OF THE JOINT
STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF TIHE COMMONWEALTI OF
PENNSYLvANIA, PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS TO TIlE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
94 (1952).
53. U.C.C. § 3-702(3) (1950 proposed final draft) provided:
Where a check or similar payment instrument provides that it is in full satisfaction of
an obligation the payee satisfies the underlying obligation by negotiating the instrument
or obtaining its payment unless he establishes that the original obligor has taken un-
conscionable advantage in the circumstances or unless it is the drawer who has initiated
collection on behalf of the payee.
54. U.C.C. § 1-207 (1950 proposed final draft).
55. See U.C.C. § 1-207.
56. Hawkland, The Effect of U.C.C. § 1-207 on the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by
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The drafters of the Code probably did not intend to write two sec-
tions affecting accord and satisfaction doctrine, and it is clear from
the comments that section 3-802(3) was meant to apply to accord and
satisfaction. The Official Comments usually point out significant
changes in existing case law.5 7  Because the Oflicial Comments to
section 1-207 fail to mention any significant change that section 1-207
might make in the established accord and satisfaction doctrine, the
drafters of the Code likely did not initially intend for section 1-207
to apply to accord and satisfaction.
In the Uniform Commercial Code Official Draft of 1952 [herein-
after referred to as 1952 Official Code Draft], the number of section
3-702 was changed back to 3-802;58 however, in a supplement to the
1952 Official Code Draft, the Enlarged Editorial Board recommended
the deletion of subsection (3) of section 3-802 because the "provision
evoked criticism on the ground that it would work hardship, and was
open to abuse."59  That was the beginning of the end for section
3-802(3); the same comment appeared in the 1954 amendments to the
Code60 and the 1956 recommendations of the Editorial Board.61
Finally, in the official 1957 text, all traces of section 3-802(3) were re-
moved.62
Section 1-207, on the other hand, has remained intact and ap-
pears in the most recent version of the Code. Since it is probable that
the drafters of the Code did not intend for section 1-207 to apply to
accord and satisfaction cases in 1950 and 1952 when section 1-207
appeared in the same drafts as section 3-802(3) (designated section
3-702(3) in the 1950 version of the Code). one would assume that if
the drafters had intended section 1-207 to fill the void left by elimina-
tion of section 3-802(3), they would have mentioned this in the com-
ments to section 1-207 in the 1957 Code. However, as noted earlier,
section 1-207 had the same comments in 1957 as in 1950 when the
section was first introduced. The most plausible explanation is that
Conditional Check, 74 CoM. L.J. 329, 331 (1969). This author was suggesting that section 1-207
might apply to accord and satisfaction in the manner that it was applied by the Scholl court.
57. Id. at 331.
58. U.C.C. § 3-802 (1952 official draft). Section 3-802(3) provided, "Where a check or simi-
lar payment instrument provides that it is in full satisfaction of ar obligation the payee dis-
charges the underlying obligation by obtaining payment of the instrtment unless he establishes
that the original obligor has taken unconscionable advantage in the circumstances."
59. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONIERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, SUPPLEMENT No. I TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF VIlE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 25 (1955).
60. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, NATL CONF. OF COMIISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AMENDMENTS 1954, at 25 (1954).
61. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR TIlE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 132 (1956).
62. U.C.C. § 3-802 (1957 official text).
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the drafters of the Code decided to leave accord and satisfaction to
the courts. The Enlarged Editorial Board may have believed that
section 3-802(3) would make the doctrine of accord and satisfaction
too rigid. The "abuse" envisioned by the board63 may have been that
debtors would begin to mark all checks "paid in full," causing un-
suspecting creditors to lose their rights to collect even liquidated debts,
in direct opposition to Foakes v. Beer.
The background of section 3-112(1)() is further evidence that the
drafters of the Code intended that section 3-802 and not section 1-207
would apply to accord and satisfaction. Section 3-112(l)(f) of the
current Code states that the negotiability of a draft is not impaired if
the draft contains a statement that it is offered in full satisfaction of an
obligation of the drawer." The 1949 Code Draft first contained
section 3-112(l)(f) with substantially the same language.65 Official
Comment four to section 3-112 of the 1949 Code Draft read: "Para-
graph (f) is new. The effect of a clause of acknowledgment of satis-
faction upon negotiability has been uncertain under the original sec-
tion. Its effect upon satisfaction of the obligation is covered in Section
3-802(3)."66  The 1950 Final Code Draft67 and the 1952 Official Code
Draft68 contained the same section and comment. In the 1957 Code,
however, the reference to section 3-802(3) in Comment four to sec-
tion 3-112 was deleted, 69 since section 3-802(3) itself was deleted from
the 1957 version of the Code.70  Comment four to section 3-112 has
remained the same since 1957.
If section 1-207 was meant to apply to accord and satisfaction
concurrently with section 3-802(3) in 1950 and 1952 when section
3-802(3) was part of the Code, the section should have been men-
tioned in Comment four to section 3-112 along with section 3-802(3).
If section 1-207 was meant to fill the void left by the elimination of
section 3-802(3) in 1957, mention of section 1-207 should have been
added to Comment four. The drafters' treatment of Comment four
to section 3-112 is a clear indication that section 1-207 was never
intended to apply to accord and satisfaction, either concurrently with
or in place of section 3-802(3).
63. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
64. U.C.C. § 3-112(1)(f) provides: "(1) The negotiability of an instrument is not affected
by . . . (f) a term in a draft providing that the payee by indorsing or cashing it acknowledges
full satisfaction of an obligation of the drawer . ..
65. U.C.C. § 3-112(l)(f) (1949 draft).
66. U.C.C. § 3-112, Official Comment 4 (1949 draft) (emphasis added).
67. U.C.C. § 3-112, Official Comment 4 (1950 proposed final draft).
68. U.C.C. § 3-112, Official Comment 4 (1952 official draft).
69. U.C.C. § 3-112 Official Comment 4 (1957 official text) stated: "Paragraph (1) is new.
The effect of a clause of acknowledgment of satisfaction upon negotiability has been uncertain
under the original section."
70. See U.C.C. § 3-802 (1957 official text).
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2. State Adoption Committees
Although no case law mentioned Code section 1-207 with respect
to accord and satisfaction until Hanna v. Perkins7' in 1965, many
state adoption committees recognized that a literal reading of section
1-207 could affect accord and satisfaction. The Scholl opinion men-
tioned the text of the New York annotations to section 1-207: "The
Code rule would permit, in Code-covered transactions, the acceptance
of a part performance or payment tendered in full settlement without
requiring the acceptor to gamble with his legal right to demand the
balance of the performance or payment. 7 2  The Massachusetts 7
and New Hampshire74 versions of Code section 1-207 are accompa-
nied by similar annotations. The authors of a Minnesota study be-
lieved that section 1-207 could allow a creditor to accept partial
payment of a disputed debt and to avoid accord and satisfaction in
one limited case: when the debtor paid only the portion of the debt
that he admitted to be owing, and the creditor reserved his right to
collect the disputed balance.7  This situation would arise if a creditor
claimed $500, but the debtor claimed that he owed $400, and he sent
a check for $400 marked "paid in full" instead of, perhaps, a check
for $450. According to the Minnesota study, if the creditor ex-
plicitly reserved his rights there would be no accord and satisfaction.
The New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire annotations, and
the Minnesota study show that the language of section 1-207 has been
construed to alter the common-law rights of the parties to an accord
and satisfaction.
South Dakota does not have a report by a special Code adoption
committee. No reference is made under South Dakota Compiled Laws
Annotated section 57-1-23 to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
Whether or not the South Dakota legislature anticipated the Scholl
interpretation of Code section 1-207 is not clear. If the South Dakota
legislature did not foresee the Scholl interpretation of Code section
1-207 it is not alone; many other states' annotations to Code section
1-207 refer only to continuing performance after a breach of contract.
7 6
71. 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1044 (Westchester County Ct. N.Y. 1965).
72. 247 N.W.2d at 492. See COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STAT LAWS, NEW YORK AN-
NOTATIONS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND REPORT OF COMMI;SION ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS TO LEGISLATURE OF NEW YORK STATE 19-20 (1961).
73. ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT CONTAINING TILE
MASSACHUSETrS UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 41-43 (1958).
74. BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. 1959 NEW HAMI'SIIIRE
ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 14 (1959).
75. S. KINYON & R. MCCLURE, A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM COMMtRCIAL
CODE ON MINNESOTA LAW 40-41 (1964).
76. See, e.g., SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY. SIXTH PROORNS Rt-
PORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1, TIlE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COOE 34 (1960) (California);
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A Florida study specifically states that section 1-207 makes no change
in the current law."
Although the states' adoption committees were split on their
interpretations of section 1-207, the legislative history of the Code
demonstrates that the drafters did not intend section 1-207 to apply
to accord and satisfaction. However, rather than basing its decision
upon the interpretation of section 1-207 given by the drafters of the
Code, the South Dakota Supreme Court chose to rely upon the in-
terpretation of the section given by two lower courts in other states.
C. Post-Code Cases
The two cases relied upon by the Scholl court in its interpreta-
tion of Code section 1-207 stand in direct contrast to the settled case
law78 and possibly the language of section 1-207 itself.79  Baillie
Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp.80 was a North Carolina Court
of Appeals case that was not appealed. The creditor, Baillie Lumber,
agreed to accept a portion of a debt owed by Kincaid Carolina in
full satisfaction if paid by a certain date. Kincaid Carolina tendered
two checks in payment after the stipulated date. Baillie Lumber
believed that the agreement .for part payment was no longer in effect,
since Kincaid Carolina was late in paying, and cashed the checks after
noting that it reserved the right to collect the balance of Kincaid
Carolina's debt.81 The court found that the debt was liquidated, and
therefore there could be no accord and satisfaction.8 2
The court stated that Baillie Lumber had reserved its rights as
provided by North Carolina's version of Code section 1-207.83 How-
ever, the opinion does not resolve whether the court believed that the
-reservation of rights under Code section 1-207 would avoid accord and
satisfaction of liquidated debts, unliquidated debts, or both. Since
the North Carolina court had found that the debt in Baillie was liqui-
dated, it is probable that the court was writing in relation to liquidated
debts. It is not clear that the court would have applied Code section
1-207 to the accord and satisfaction of an unliquidated debt. Thus,
KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: KANSAS ANNOTATIONS 18-19
(1964); LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, COMMONWALTHi OF KENTUCKY, RtsEARCil
PUBLICATION No. 49, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON ExISTING
KENTUCKY LAW 17-18 (1957).
77. FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FLORIDA STUDY AND COMMITS ON
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 (1966).
78. See notes 17 and 19 supra.
79. See section IV. infra.
80. 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969).
81. Id. at 347-348, 167 S.E.2d at 89.
82. Id. at 351, 167 S.E.2d at 91.
83. Id. at 353, 167 S.E.2d at 93. North Carolina's version of U.C.C. § 1-207 is N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-1-207 (1965).
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the case is very weak authority for the position taken by the Scholl
court that Code section 1-207 authorizes a creditor to avoid accord
and satisfaction of an unliquidated debt simply by cashing a check
upon which he has made a conditional endorsement.
Hanna v. Perkins8 4 contains the strongest language supporting the
result reached in Scholl. The court in Hanna first came to a con-
clusion similar to that reached by the Baillie court: there was a liqui-
dated obligation and therefore no basis for an accord and satisfac-
tion.85 But, in dictum, the Hanna court stated:
If it were not that this court finds that triable issues of fact are present,
this court would deny the motion by holding this particular section of
the code [section 1-207] would seem to favor plaintiff's overriding in-
dorsement of "Deposited under protest" as a reservation of his right to
collect payment of balance.8 6
The main triable issue of fact in Hanna was whether the debt was
liquidated. The court resolved that the debt was liquidated; there-
fore, the quotation above could be paraphrased to read that if the
debt were unliquidated the creditor could reserve his rights under section
1-207. Thus, the Hanna court specifically indicated that section 1-207
would apply to accord and satisfaction of unliquidated debts. How-
ever, the court's reference to Code section 1-207 was dictum only,
making the case of questionable value to the Schol court in reaching
its similar conclusion. Furthermore, Hanna was a New York case.
The annotations to New York's version of Code section 1-207 specif-
ically refer to accord and satisfaction as an area of the law possibly
affected by the section.87
The Scholl opinion contains no mention of a Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals case decided in 1973 that discussed Code section 1-207
in relation to accord and satisfaction, Teledyne Mid-America Corp. v.
HOH Corp. 8  In Teledyne, Teledyne Mid-America Corporation sued
HOH Corporation and the husband and wife owners C. W. and Jane
Shafer. After affirming the trial court's dismissal of the claim against
Mr. and Mrs. Shafer, 89 the court considered Teledyne's claim against
HOH, which HOH argued was extinguished by an accord and satis-
faction. 90
The dispute between HOH and Teledyne was the result of two
claims. The first claim was asserted by Teledyne against HOH for
84. 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1044 (Westchester County Ct. N.Y. 1965).
85. Id. at 1045.
86. Id. at 1046.
87. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
88. 486 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1973).
89. Id. at 991.
90. Id. at 992.
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trade debts incurred by its predecessor, Shafer Company, Inc.91
Second, HOH claimed that Teledyne owed HOH $40,860 from a
distribution profit protection fund for HOH's uncollectible accounts.
In paying the amount owed by Shafer Company to Teledyne, HOH
offset its claim on the distribution profit protection fund against the
larger amount that HOH owed Teledyne as Shafer Company's guar-
antor. HOH's check contained on its reverse side: "In full payment
of all HOH trade obligations."92 Teledyne argued that the cashing of
HOH's check by Teledyne's accounting department was not an effec-
tive acceptance for purposes of accomplishing an accord and satisfac-
tion.93 However, when Teledyne officials were subsequently notified of
the compromise tender, they informed HOH that the check was ac-
cepted as partial payment only.94 The court held that the action of
the officials indicated that they had accepted the check, but attempted
to reserve Teledyne's right to sue for the balance. 95 Therefore, the
case presented a classic accord and satisfaction situation in which the
creditor cashed the check and attempted to reserve his right to sue for
the balance. In accordance with the prevailing common law, the dis-
trict court decision for HOH was affirmed.9 6
The facts of Teledyne presented the typical application of accord
and satisfaction doctrine, just as did the facts of Scholl. There was
an unliquidated debt, a conditional tender of a check in the disputed
range, and an acceptance and explicit reservation of rights by the
creditor. The Ninth Circuit stated in a footnote: "Neither party has
considered the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to this
transaction. On the facts, there is strong reason to doubt that section
1-207 is pertinent. Under the circumstances we do not find it appro-
priate to discuss it."97
It is unclear whether the court failed to discuss Code section 1-207
because it found that the section was inapplicable or because the issue
had not been raised by either party. The court's reference to section
1-207 was admittedly dictum. The decision, however, is at least as
persuasive as the two lower court decisions relied upon in Scholl. The
statement by the Ninth Circuit should have been followed by the
South Dakota court in Scholl, not only because it is in accordance with
the intention of the drafters of the Code,98 but as a matter of basic
91. Id. at 991.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 992.
94. Id. at 991-92.
95. Id. at 994.
96. Id. at 995.
97. Id. at 993 n.6.
98. See section II.B.I. supra.
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
contract law principles. The Scholl analysis does not retain the re-
quirement of mutual assent necessary for an accord and satisfaction.
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF MUTUAL ASSENT
The most critical problem with the result of the Scholl decision
is the lack of mutual assent between the parties. Suppose that C per-
forms work for D under a contract that mentions levels of quality with-
out specifying any objective means of measuring quality. The con-
tract price is $5,000 but D believes that because of poor workmanship,
only $4,000 should be paid; C of course disagrees. D tenders a check
for $4,500 marked "paid in full." At this point, C has been given an
offer to settle that he can accept or reject. When C cashes the check,
there is objective mutual assent to an accord and satisfaction. The
fact that C does not know the legal consequences or his act is not con-
trolling;99 C understood that D offered to settle the dispute with a
check tendered in full payment. In this case, D has not unilaterally
determined Cs rights. However, allowing C to reserve his rights by
stipulating a condition on the back of D's check before cashing it
leaves D no opportunity to accept or reject Cs "counteroffer." D
might have preferred either to settle or to litigate the entire matter.
If C is allowed to reserve his rights, D can litigate only the remaining
amount due.
Professor Williston believed that when a creditor cashes a check
tendered in full settlement of a disputed debt with the sole intention
of reducing the debtor's account, "[ilt is impossible to find the ordinary
elements of a bargain in such a case. There is not only no mutual as-
sent mentally, but there is no expression of mutual assent." 1 In an
accord and satisfaction both parties have made decisions to substitute
a new performance for the old contract. If the creditor is allowed
simply to reserve his rights and cash the check, he is unilaterally de-
termining his own rights and those of the debtor.101 One of the earliest
accord and satisfaction cases asserted: "And always the manner of the
tender and of the payment shall be directed by him who made the ten-
der or payment, and not by him who accepts it.
10 02
Code section 1-207 can be interpreted to maintain the requirement
of mutual assent. By inserting the words "creditor" and "debtor" into
section 1-207, it can be demonstrated that section 1-207 does not alter
the common-law doctrine. "A [creditor] who with explicit reservation
99. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20, Comment a (1932).
100. 15 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1855, at 552 (3d ed. 1972),
101. See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, REPORT ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 22 (1962).
102. Pinners Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237, 238 (C.P. 1602).
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of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance
in a manner demanded or offered by the [debtor] does not thereby
prejudice the rights reserved . . ." The key phrase is "in a manner
demanded or offered by the [debtor]." In order for the creditor to
cash the debtor's check for payment on account only, that act by the
creditor would have to be the performance demanded or offered by the
debtor. This is not the case when the debtor has tendered a check in
full satisfaction of his debt. The debtor is offering a substituted per-
formance to extinguish the debt, whereas the creditor is simply reduc-
ing the debt and reserving his right to the balance.
This Case Comment does not suggest that the established ac-
cord and satisfaction doctrine for unliquidated debts is the only solu-
tion or even the best solution. Accord and satisfaction can be a harsh
doctrine, especially when large sums of money are in dispute. It
may force a creditor to accept needed partial payments rather than to
reserve the right to obtain the benefit of his bargain with the debtor.
For example, a contractor with bills to pay is hard pressed not to
accept $800,000 tendered in piyment of a debt that the contractor
believes should be $1,000,000, and yet the $200,000 balance is
probably the difference between a profitable and an unprofitable ven-
ture. Nevertheless, so long as there is no unfairness, the law favors
settlements between parties. t'0 Section 1-207, according to the draft-
ers of the Code and one interpretation of the language, should not
change the common law when a check is tendered in full settlement of
an unliquidated debt.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Should other courts decide to follow the Scholl decision, debtors
may still offer a check in full settlement of an unliquidated debt. The
Code allows parties to vary its provisions unless otherwise provided. 104
Since section 1-207 does not prohibit the alteration of its provisions
by agreement, a variation by the parties would be proper. At least two
writers have suggested that a condition be written on the back of a
debtor's check tendered in full settlement to avoid the result reached
in Scholl.'0 5 The purpose of this inscription would be to fully inform
the creditor of the debtor's intentions and further, to provide a court
103. Hager v. Thomson, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 80 (1861); Simons v. Supreme Council Am.
Legion of Honor, 178 N.Y. 263, 70 N.E. 776 (1904).
104. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) provides:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise
provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such
obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
105. Hawkland, supra note 56, at 342; Comment, Accord and Satisfaction. Conditional
Tender By Check Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 BUFFALo L REv. 539, 544 (1969).
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that might feel compelled to follow Scholl with a basis for dis-
tinguishing the case. ' °6 The debtor's inscription might provide:
This check is offered solely for the purpose of fully settling (debtor's)
debt to (creditor) arising out of (specify obligation). (Creditor) may ac-
cept the offer to settle by cashing this check or reject the offer to settle by
destroying or returning the check. Should (creditor) cash this check,
(creditor) is agreeing to waive the provisions of Uniform Commercial Code§ 1-207 as those provisions apply to this debt.
The statement above or one similar should demonstrate to a court that
the creditor is fully aware of the consequences of cashing the check
and that the debtor has not taken unfair advantage of the creditor.
Until the courts are settled on the applicability of section 1-207 to
accord and satisfaction, debtors might be well advised to include such
a statement on all checks tendered in full settlement of an unliquidated
debt.
VI. CONCLUSION
The method suggested above for altering the provisions of sec-
tion 1-207 illustrates the unreasonable position adopted by the Scholl
court. If Scholl is followed and debtors begin to write long narratives
on the backs of their checks, creditors will undoubtedly develop equally
long endorsement notations to neutralize the debtors' inscriptions. The
result would be very similar to the "battle of the forms" that developed
during pre-Code days to protect buyers and sellers in the offer and
acceptance stage of contracting.107 The Scholl interpretation does not
further the underlying purposes and policies of the Code, as stated in
section 1-102(2)(a), "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law govern-
ing commercial transactions."10' 8 The Scholl analysis could cause the
consummation of an accord and satisfaction through the tender of a
check in full payment of an unliquidated debt to become unduly
complicated.
Scholl gives section 1-207 one possible reading based upon two
lower state court opinions,'0 9 a comment of the Commission on Uni-
form State Laws,"0 and a text based on the same two cases and on
the same comment."' In contrast, the legislative history indicates
that the drafters did not intend for Code section 1-207 to apply to ac-
106. See Comment, Accord and Satisfaction: Conditional Tender by Check Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 539, 544 (1969).
107. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 36 (1970).
108. U.C.C. § 1-I02(2)(a).
109. Bailie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App 342, 167 SE,2d 85 (1969);
Hanna v. Perkins, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1044 (Westchester County Ct. N.Y. 1965).
110. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
111. See note 31 supra.
[Vol. 38:921
1977] ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 937
cord and satisfaction, and most state adoption committees did not
indicate that section 1-207 would change existing case law. The re-
quirement of mutual assent to an accord and satisfaction is not met
by the Scholl interpretation of section 1-207. Furthermore, the
language of section 1-207 does not authorize ignoring the common
law requirement of mutual assent. As a matter of contract principles
and analysis of the Code, "there is strong reason to doubt that section
1-207 is pertinent' ' m to accord and satisfaction doctrine.
R. Steven Kestner
112. Teledyne Mid-America Corp. v. HOH Corp., 486 F.2d 987, 993 n.6 (9th Cir. 1973).

